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Real Property 
by Herbert I. Lazerow* 
Abandonment and Adverse Possession 
During the year, the California courts made the acquisition 
of property, either by adverse possession or possession as a 
result of the owner's abandonment, more difficult. While 
the courts did not change the rules of law they insisted on 
their pristine application. This demonstrates an understand-
able tendency, in an urbanizing society, toward restricting the 
transfer of title by possession alone to non-owners. 
Adverse Possession 
In Schoenfelt v. Pritzker/ plaintiff sought to quiet title to 
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six acres which defendants, the neighboring landowners, 
had cultivated in annual crops for twenty years. Although 
defendants had not paid taxes on the property, as required 
for adverse possession by California Code of Civil Procedure, 
section 325, they contended that the action was barred by 
section 318 of that code, which provides that no action for re-
covery of real property can be maintained unless plaintiff 
was seized or possessed of the property within five years of 
bringing suit. Plaintiff had not been in possession for the past 
twenty years, but the court held that the phrase "seized or 
possessed" included the seisin of a titleholder not in actual 
possession of the property. This construction integrates the 
two sections and provides that title may not be acquired by 
adverse possession unless, in addition to the other require-
ments,2 the possessor has paid all taxes on the property. This 
would seem to conform to the legislative intent of the sections. 
The court took a strict position in Gerhard v. Stephens.3 
Plaintiffs, the owners of mineral rights, sued to quiet title 
to the mineral interests. Defendants were the owners of the 
surface, who had used it fully for longer than the period re-
quired for adverse possession. Since the mineral rights were 
not separately assessed, defendants had paid taxes for the 
statutory period. Defendants had also given mineral leases 
for their entire tract, which included the land on which the 
plaintiffs had drilling rights. All drilling, however, occurred 
outside plaintiffs' interest. The court held that possession 
of the surface did not include adverse possession of the 
mineral rights when such rights had been severed from the 
surface by deed. Nor does assertion of dominion over the 
mineral rights by giving a lease constitute adverse possession. 
Since no one drilled for minerals on plaintiffs' mineral lands, 
the plaintiffs had no cause of action for ejectment. 
Defendants also invoked the doctrine of constructive ad-
verse possession which provides that where a person is in 
adverse possession under color of title, the possession is 
deemed to apply to the entire tract described in his document 
2. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 322- 3. 68 Cal.2d 864, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 
325. 442 P.2d 692 (1968). 
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of title. The court properly rejected this contention, force-
fully making the point that for the doctrine of constructive ad-
verse possession to apply, there must be some actual adverse 
possession on which an action of ejectment could rest. None 
existed in this case. 
A case that took a view favorable to the acquisition of 
title by adverse possession was Lawrence v. Maloof.4 Plaintiff 
purchased property at an execution sale in 1955, but the mar-
shal's deed was not delivered until 1964. Plaintiff then 
brought an action to quiet title against adverse possessors 
on the land who had paid the taxes throughout the entire 
period. The court held that plaintiff's cause of action accrued 
when he made the purchase at the execution sale since he had 
the right to eject anyone on the property at that time. He had 
absolute title, subject only to the former owner's right of re-
demption. Since the court held the date of delivery of the 
deed irrelevant, defendants acquired title by adverse pos-
session. 
Abandonment 
In Gerhard, the court, after discussing adverse possession, 
went on to discuss the doctrine of abandonment. The de-
fendants, in addition to their arguments for adverse possession, 
contended that plaintiffs had abandoned their interests in the 
mineral rights. 
The court first held that an interest in oil and gas, being a 
profit a prendre, is closest to an easement in its characteristics 
and should be equally subject to abandonment. The fee 
simple interest in real property may not be abandoned be-
cause the property would be left without a titleholder. When 
a mineral lease or easement is abandoned, however, the 
interest reverts to the owner of the fee. This permits the 
clearing of title to mineral land, particularly when the interest 
is held by unknown parties. The court reaffirmed this tradi-
tional doctrine of abandonment, then proceeded to hold that 
4. 256 Cal. App.2d 600, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
233 (1967). 
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one of the prerequisites, intention to abandon, was not ful-
filled by one group of plaintiffs. 
The comparison between the two groups is instructive. 
Neither group made any use of the mineral rights during 
the half century that elapsed between their acquisition and 
the subsequent drilling under lease from defendants. The 
following acts of one group of plaintiffs were held insufficient 
as a matter of law to support a finding of intent to abandon: 
Failure to include their interest in the estates of deceased 
owners; failure to enter the land or attempt to search for 
oil or lease to others the right to search; failure to have their 
mineral rights separately assessed by the county for tax pur-
poses; and failure to seek their share of the proceeds of oil 
leases given by the surface owners. The court buttressed its 
judgment by pointing out that these plaintiffs were but several 
of 148 different owners, many of whom could not be located. 
To begin drilling would have put the expense and risk on these 
owners completely. If they had succeeded, they would have 
had to share the proceeds with all of the other owners. In 
light of these economic realities, the omissions noted above 
by themselves were not sufficent evidence of intent to abandon. 
It is unclear whether the economic exigencies were the crucial 
factors, or whether the case stands for the proposition that 
non-use is never sufficient to establish intent to abandon, thus 
overruling to that extent cases such as Payne v. Neuval. 5 It 
does overrule Romero v. Brewer,6 which found abandonment 
of an oil lease as a result of inadequate machinery for drilling, 
failure to obtain a permit from the state, and failure to erect 
a derrick. These would seem to be simply non-use and, if 
anything, would indicate an intention to drill which was 
carried out in an inefficient manner. 7 
The other group of plaintiffs was held to have abandoned 
their interests when they refused to accept distribution of 
them from the executor of their predecessor's estate as being 
worthless. The specific rejection, added to half a century of 
5. 155 Cal. 46, 99 P. 476 (1908). 7. To the same effect, see Rice v. 
6. 58 Cal. App.2d 759, 137 P.2d 872 Lee, 44 Cal. App.2d 909, 113 P.2d 235 
(1943). (1941). 
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non-use, was sufficient to find intent to abandon. The non-
renouncing group was fortunate in not knowing of their in-
terest; they had no opportunity to renounce and so prevailed. 
In the course of the discussion of abandonment, the court 
pointed out that a conscientious owner of a mineral interest 
can always avoid abandonment by requesting that a separate 
tax assessment be assigned for the mineral interests.s Con-
tinuous payment of taxes negates any presumption of intent 
to abandon that might be raised by other statements or 
activities. 
Vendor and Purchaser 
Consumer Protection 
Traditionally, the consumer in a real estate transaction 
had no protection against the seller. No warranties were 
implied for real estate sales or construction.9 Any express 
warranties that existed in the contract were extinguished by 
merger into the deed.1o 
The latter rule has been specifically relaxed in some juris-
dictions,ll and impliedly relaxed in California.12 There has 
also been a tendency to expand the definition of fraud in realty 
sales in order to avoid the harshness of caveat emptor.13 Two 
cases decided this year confirmed the growing trend toward 
8. Rev. and Tax. Code § 2803. An-
other case strictly confining the doctrine 
of abandonment with regard to ease-
ments by grant is Faus v. City of Los 
Angeles, 67 Ca1.2d 350, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
193, 431 P.2d 849 (1967). 
9. Williston, Contracts § 926 (1963); 
Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of 
Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 
14 Vand. L. Rev. 541 (1961). 
10. Williston, Contracts (1963) §§ 
926, 926(a). 
11. Weck v. A:M Sunrise Construc-
tion Co., 36 Ill. App.2d 383, 184 
N.E.2d 728 (1962). (Merger depends 
on intention of the parties; no merger 
found. The Weck case also found an 
implied warranty in the contract. This 
holding was later overruled in Coutra-
kon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App.2d 290, 188 
N.E.2d 780 (1963), affirmed on other 
grounds, 31 Ill.2d 189, 201 N.E.2d 
100. 
12. Greenberg v. Hastie, 202 Cal. 
App.2d 159, 20 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1962). 
Cf. Pollyanna Homes, Inc. v. Berney, 
56 Cal.2d 676, 16 Cal. Rptr. 345, 365 
P.2d 401 (1961). 
13. Buist v. C. Dudley De Velbiss 
Corp. 182 Cal. App.2d 325, 6 Cal. 
Rptr. 259 (1960). 
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more consumer protection. One case presages the imposition 
of implied warranties in real estate contracts. 
In Sweeney v. Stone,14 defendant purchased subdivision lots 
and hired a contractor to construct a house on one of them. 
Though unstable soil is common in the area, no soil tests were 
made. Plaintiff purchased the completed house from defend-
ant. Much of the lot eroded during the ensuing rainy season. 
Plaintiff recovered damages for negligence from defendant, 
on the theory that defendant and his contractor had a duty 
to plaintiff to construct the home is a non-negligent manner. 
The court ignored the fact that the house was built by de-
fendant for sale, which might have been a significant dis-
tinction.1s Failure to draw the distinction was proper in this 
case, where the house would be sold to some person, although 
his exact identity was unknown. The decision solidifies a 
line of cases dating from 1963 permitting a buyer of a house 
to hold the builder liable for damage to the house caused by 
negligence in its construction,16 and extends it to damage done 
to the land by such negligence. 
Coons v. Gunn17 is a fragmentary opinion that breaks star-
tling new ground in the field of real property sales. Plaintiff's 
assignor agreed to sell undeveloped property to defendant 
buyers for $80,000. As a result of soil tests, buyers refused 
to proceed with the contract unless the price was reduced to 
$70,000. An appropriate amendment was made to the escrow 
instructions. Then buyers discovered that there were no 
sewer connections to the property, septic tanks were forbidden, 
and substantial off-site improvements would be needed to 
connect to the nearest sewer line. They refused to proceed 
with the contract. Plaintiff sued for damages. The appellate 
court held that from the circumstances surrounding the sale, 
14. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. 497 (1968). 
15. See Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal.2d 
857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 
(1961) (landowner recovered damages 
for negligence of contractor in install-
ing swimming pool in land already 
owned). 
470 CAL LAW 1969 
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17. 263 Cal. App.2d 594, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 876 (1968). 
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there was an implied condition that the lots were usable as resi-
dentiallots without substantial and expensive work. It also 
reversed the trial court's finding that the property was usable 
residential property, because the evidence was insufficient 
for the finding. Thus, in the absence of waiver of the con-
dition by the buyers, damages for their failure to perform 
could not be recovered. 
The implications of the case are enormous. Knowledge 
that the buyers were seeking the property for residential use 
was held sufficient to imply a condition of suitability. This 
will protect buyers who, as in this case, refuse to complete the 
contract. 
But the case contains broader implications. If a con-
dition of suitability can be implied, why not a covenant of 
suitability? This is nothing more than a warranty of suit-
ability, the breach of which will incur a suit for damages. 
Such a warranty would be of substantial help to the vast 
majority of buyers with complaints about real estate pur-
chases. Most of them do not discover that the property is un-
inhabitable or unsuitable for the planned use until after the 
deed is delivered; then the buyers try to use it. The buyer 
needs a remedy that will permit him to keep the land and 
recover whatever damages are required to make the land 
suitable for his use. 
The doctrine that the contract of sale is merged into the 
deed, even if it contains implied warranties, should be no 
obstacle to recovery, since the doctrine is being relaxed. If 
the standard for merger is the intention of the parties, merger 
should not be found where there is an implied warranty. 
Warranties must survive the delivery of the deed to be effec-
tive, so the parties could not have intended to extinguish them 
with the deed. 
Even without an extension into warranties it will add 
enormously to the remedies of innocent buyers. They will no 
longer be obligated to prove fraud in order to avoid the con-
tract. Proof that both parties knew that buyers had planned 
to use the property for a residence and that it is unsuitable 
for such use is sufficient. Presumably, the rule would apply 
CAL LAW 1969 471 
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to old housing as well as new, and provide a full defense to 
a suit for damages or for the purchase price in a case where 
the property did not meet the provisions of the Housing Code 
in force at the time18 or, with multi-unit rental property, where 
the zoning ordinance did not permit the use contemplated by 
the parties. 
Strict Compliance with Sales Contract 
In several cases this year, the courts have insisted on 
strict compliance with the contract of sale before the parties 
will be granted specific performance. Substantial performance 
was deemed insufficient. 
In Moss v. Minor Properties Inc./9 plaintiff seller and de-
fendant buyer executed identical escrow instructions provid-
ing that if the conditions of the escrow were not completed 
by March 1, 1965, they could be completed thereafter unless 
a written demand was made by one of the parties to cease the 
escrow. On the date appointed, the deed had been sent to the 
title company but not recorded, and no title insurance had been 
issued. On that day the buyer received approval of his loan, 
but instructed the escrow holder in writing to terminate the 
escrow. The court held that unless the terms of the escrow 
were strictly complied with, specific performance should not 
be granted. The fact that the purchaser deposited the pur-
chase price with the escrow holder after learning that escrow 
would not close on March 1, 1965, was held not to constitute 
a waiver; he merely complied with his covenant. 
In Andover Land Co. v. Hofjman,20, 1 the court found strict 
compliance with the escrow instructions. These instructions 
set a closing date on the escrow. It was provided that a party 
who had fully complied could thereafter demand termination 
of the escrow, but that no termination would be permitted 
until five days after notice of the demand had been given to the 
other party. Since the defaulting party had cured his default 
18. See e.g., Brown v. Southall ReaI- 19. 262 Cal. App.2d 847, 69 Cal. 
ty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. Rptr. 341 (1968). 
[1968]); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 20, 1. 264 Cal. App.2d 87, 70 Cal. 
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). Rptr. 38 (1968). 
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within five days, the demand was insufficient to terminate the 
escrow. 
Escrows 
The courts discussed the liability of escrow holders in 
several cases. In Lee v. Title Insurance & Trust CO.,2 plaintiff 
sued defendant escrow holder for failure to notify plaintiffs 
that sellers were defrauding them, since the $135,000 trust 
deed they were receiving secured only a $100,000 note. The 
court exonerated the escrow holder because it had faithfully 
executed its instructions. The rationale was that the escrow 
agency is limited and liability would subject the escrow 
holder to a high litigation risk. In every case where a real 
estate transaction fails, the injured party would sue the es-
crowee for failure to disclose. While this argument is not 
overly persuasive, it is difficult to place an absolute obligation 
on the escrow holder to reveal anything of which he has knowl-
edge or notice. He is not a trustee for the parties, only an 
agent for limited purposes. Plaintiff argued that where the 
purposes were such that they gave the escrow holder a unique 
opportunity to discover the facts, he should have had an obli-
gation to disclose them. The court correctly refused to accept 
this argument. 
Consistent with the Lee holding, Kish v. Bay Counties Title 
Guarantee Co.3 held an escrow holder liable for consequential 
damages when he failed to follow instructions. A qualifica-
tion, however, was placed on this liability. Where the con-
ditions in the escrow could not have benefited the injured 
party, the escrow holder was not liable to him. Plaintiff 
sued the escrow holder for all damages resulting from a 
disastrous real property deal wherein he exchanged his house 
and a substantial note for Nevada commercial property. The 
escrow holder neglected to have plaintiff sign the trust deed 
on the Nevada property called for in escrow agreement. The 
escrow holder was held not liable for the damages resulting 
from completion of the transaction. He was, however, held 
2. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. 3. 254 Cal. App.2d 725, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 378 (1968). 494 (1967). 
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liable in the amount of any deficiency judgment recovered 
by the note holder against plaintiff.4 
Akin v. Business Title Corp.5 nullified exculpatory clauses 
in escrow contracts. The escrow company placed an exculpa-
tory clause in its contract relieving itself from liability for 
ordinary negligence. It erroneously recorded a trust deed in 
Los Angeles County instead of in Orange County where the 
land was located. The buyer went bankrupt and seller was 
left without a remedy. Overruling Simmons v. Bank of 
America,6 the court held the exculpatory clause invalid. On 
the authority of Tunkl v. Regents oj the University oj Cali-
jornia,7 the court found the clause to be against the public 
interest if: (1) it involved a transaction which concerned a 
business of a type suitable for public regulation; (2) the 
party insisting on the exculpatory clause had a decisive ad-
vantage of bargaining strength because of the importance of 
the service to the public; and (3) no provisions were available 
for additional protection against negligence. Recognizng that 
the inherent inequality of the escrow situation requires a limit 
on contractual provisions, the court extended its view of what 
transactions constitute contracts of adhesion.8 It is likely 
that this rule will be applied to other contracts of adhesion, 
such as leases in a tight rental market. 9 
Security Problems 
This year, as last, the striking thing about property litiga-
tion is the number of cases in the field of real estate financing. 
4. See text infra at note 12. 
5. 264 Cal. App. 2d -, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 287 (1968). 
6. 159 Cal. App.2d 566, 323 P.2d 
1043 (1958). 
7. 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 
P.2d 441, 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963). 
8. See Reith, Contractual Exculpa-
tion from Tort Liability in California-
474 CAL LAW 1969 
The "True Rule" Steps Forward, 52 
Cal. L. R. 350 (1964); Grisinger v. 
Golden State Bank, 92 Cal. App. 443, 
268 P. 425 (1928). For a view of the 
policy as applied to landlord-tenant 
law, see Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305, 81 
App. D.C. 24 (1946). 
9. But see contra, Barkett v. Brucato, 
122 Cal. App.2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 
(1953). 
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Deficiency Judgments 
California Code of Civil Procedure section 580b prohibits 
a deficiency judgment where a purchase money security in-
terest is insufficient to cover the debt. This provision received 
conflicting treatment in three cases this year. 
In Paramount Savings & Loan Association v. Barber/o de-
fendant purchased property subject to a construction loan and 
executed an assumption agreement on the obligation. Al-
though defendant contended that he qualified under section 
580b because he assumed the note as a purchase money obli-
gation, the court held that the obligation must be characterized 
at the time it is initially issued, and at that time it had been 
a construction loan, not a purchase money loan. Therefore, 
the loan did not fall within section 580b and defendant cO!lld 
be subjected to a deficiency judgment. 
Defendant in this case was within the class sought to be 
protected by the anti-deficiency statute. He was a purchase 
money borrower. The only argument that can be made in 
opposition is that the lender has his rights impaired without 
consent if his obligation is changed from non-purchase money 
to purchase money after he issues it. But there is no loss in 
rights, as the lender can still recover from the original trustor 
on a personal judgment if the security is insufficient to satisfy 
the debt. The original trustor is not a purchase money debtor. 
Where the creditor has no control over the assumption, the 
assignee-debtor should nevertheless be protected by the anti-
deficiency legislation. 
The opinion fails to mention whether the loan agreement 
permitted the lender to call the loan when the property was 
sold (a common provision in trust deeds). If so, failure to 
call the loan puts the lender in the same position as though 
he had called the loan and then re-lent the money to the pur-
chaser. In that case, the lender would be a purchase money 
lender, and a substance-over-form argument would dictate 
the same result in the case at bar.11 The specific revision of 
10. 263 Cal. App.2d 166, 69 Cal. Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48 Cal. 
Rptr. 390 (1968). L. R. 705 (1960); Hetland, Deficiency 
11. Riesenseld, Calif. Legis/ation Judgment Limitations in California-A 
CAL LAW 1969 475 
11
Lazerow: Real Property
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Keal rroperty 
580b in 1963 to include 3rd party lenders points in the same 
direction. 
In two choice-of-Iaw cases, however, the court read section 
580b expansively. In Kish v. Bay Counties Title Guarantee 
CO.,12 an intervening homeowner sued the escrow-holder for 
failure to follow the escrow instructions by not preparing and 
executing a proper trust deed for the homeowner to sign. That 
would have protected him from a deficiency judgment. The 
intervener and escrowee were both California residents and 
the escrow was to be performed in California. The property 
was situated in Nevada. The court held section 580b appli-
cable despite the fact that the property in question was in an-
other jurisdiction. Since the intervener would have been pro-
tected from a deficiency judgment had the trust deed been exe-
cuted, he recovered damages. 
The second choice-of-Iaw case, Younker v. Reseda Manor/3 
concerned a deed of trust executed by a California corporation 
and a California resident in Nevada on Nevada land. The 
court rejected the argument that questions relating to real 
property are decided by the law of the situs on the reasonable 
ground that the question did not involve the real property, but 
rather concerned a personal judgment against the owner. In 
going on to balance the contacts, the court found a strong 
California policy in preserving the solvency of its residents 
and held that the statute extended to this transaction. It also 
distinguished Bernkrant v. Fowler,14 a leading choice-of-Iaw 
case, on rather dubious grounds. A more realistic distinction 
would contrast California's strong policy against deficiency 
judgments with the weaker policy of the statute of frauds 
involved in Bernkrant. 
Taken together, these cases presage a wide geographical 
scope for the protection of the California anti-deficiency 
statute. Since the predominant contact identified seems to be 
the residence of the debtor, and such actions usually must be 
New Judicial Approach, 51 Cal. L. R. 1 13. 255 Cal. App.2d 431, 63 Cal. 
(1963). Rptr. 197 (1967). 
12. 254 Cal. App.2d 725, 62 Cal. 14. 55 Cal.2d 588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 
Rptr. 494 (1967). 360 P.2d 906 (1961). 
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brought at his place of residence, effective protection can be 
given Californians from deficiency judgments. 
Union Bank v. Gradski5 also emphasized strong protection 
against deficiency judgments. Although the case involved the 
question of whether a creditor, who elected to sell property 
at a non-judicial sale could recover the deficiency from the 
guarantor, the court discussed the California Code of Civil 
Procedure section 580d. This section provides that deficiency 
judgments can be recovered only where the debtor has a right 
to redeem, that is, in a judicial foreclosure. Though only 
dictum, its force and persuasiveness carry much weight. The 
court decided that section 580d would apply to bar a guar-
antor's recovery in a suit by a guarantor who paid the debt, 
subrogated to the creditor's rights against the debtor. The 
guarantor's rights derived from the creditor's and since the 
creditor could not have recovered a deficiency, it should not 
be possible to subject the debtor to a deficiency judgment by 
adding an additional step to the process. The creditor could 
either have judicially foreclosed, preserving his right and the 
right of the guarantor to recover a deficiency from the debtor, 
or he could have elected a non-judicial sale where he would 
not have been entitled to a deficiency from the debtor. Since 
he elected a non-judicial sale, the court held that the creditor 
was estopped from recovering a deficiency from the guarantor. 
The concept of estoppel was inappropriate here. This was an 
application of the theory that any discharge of the debtor 
discharges the surety.16 
Deeds oj Trust 
Gates v. Crocker-Anglo National Bank17 involved a dragnet 
clause in a trust deed. Co-tenants of real property gave a 
trust deed to refinance the prior secured indebtedness of one 
co-tenant. The deed provided that it would secure "the pay-
ment of all other monies and indebtedness now and hereafter 
15. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. 16. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2810, 2819. 
Rptr. 64 (1968). For further discus- 17. 257 Cal. App.2d 857, 65 Cal. 
sion of this case, see YORK, REMEDIES, Rptr. 536 (1968). 
in this volume. 
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due or owing from trustor or any of them to the beneficiary." 
Unknown to the other co-tenant, a prior unsecured note of 
the first co-tenant to the beneficiary was in default. The court 
held that the other co-tenant did not intend to include the 
separate debt within the mortgage since he did not know of it. 
The case reasonably restricts the ability of a security holder 
to bring unintended debts within its ambit. This case of 
first impression in California suggests that when a pre-existing 
debt by one co-tenant is meant to be included, it must either 
be specifically included in the instrument or the holder of the 
security interest must establish that the non-debtor co-tenant 
knew of the prior debt. In dictum, the court quoted First v. 
Byrne18 with approval in setting forth the general rule that 
the property covered by the security interest is existing or 
future joint indebtedness; existing or future individual in-
debtedness of the mortgagor whose interest is foreclosed; and 
existing or future debts known or consented to by the person 
foreclosed. Although the court was able to distinguish Lan-
german v. Puritan Dining Room CO.,19 which involved ad-
vances made subsequent to the mortgage, the spirit of the two 
cases are directly opposed. Thus, security lenders would be 
wise in the future to secure specific agreements in writing for 
the inclusion of new loans in the mortgage. Relying on testi-
mony of the behavior and speech of the trustor is uncertain, 
and, without a court's finding that the party foreclosed con-
sented to the inclusion of the subsequent debt within the 
security interest, it will not be enforced. 
Manning v. Queen20 involved the impairment of a junior 
security. Trustor sued the beneficiaries of a second trust to 
enjoin foreclosure after default, contending that the payment 
of the amount of the default and the delinquency fee cured 
the default. 1 The beneficiaries contended that trustors were 
still in default since trustors had defaulted on the first trust by 
failing to pay taxes, insurance, and several fees, which the 
18. 238 Iowa 712, 28 N.W.2d 509, 20. 263 Cal. App.2d 672, 69 Cal. 
172 A.L.R. 1072 (1947). Rptr. 734 (1968). 
19. 21 Cal. App. 637, 132 P. 617 1. Cal. Civ. Code § 2924c. 
(1913). 
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beneficiary under the first trust advanced. This resulted in 
an increase in the principal of the first trust of $890. The 
second trust had required that these payments on the first 
trust be made. The beneficiaries on the first trust had, in 
fact, made the payments but had not been reimbursed by the 
trustors. The court held the trustors in default, since a trustor 
may not impair the security interest of his beneficiary. Here, 
the increase in the amount of the prior trust impaired the 
beneficiary's interest. 
The case on its facts is easy, since the provision for the pay-
ment of taxes and insurance was incorporated in the second 
trust deed and a failure to discharge these debts was both a 
technical and substantial default. A more difficult case would 
be presented where a specific provision was not included in the 
second trust. There, it would be questionable whether the 
beneficiary would be justified in considering this a default. 
He could, of course, sue for his damages resulting from the 
impairment of the security.2 The beneficiary's damages could 
be measured either by the damage to the security or by the 
extent to which the security is worth less than the debt. The 
security cushion is one of the factors taken into consideration 
in determining other aspects of the loan, such as term and in-
terest. Therefore any diminution in the value of the security 
should be recoverable3 whether it constitutes a default or not, 
and the recovery applied against the debt. 
Hill v. Gibralter Savings & Loan Association of Beverly 
Hills4 involved a trust deed sale for cash. The beneficiary of 
the first trust deed bid the amount due on that trust. A 
stranger raised the bid several hundred dollars. Plaintiff, the 
beneficiary under the second trust, bid a higher amount but 
was unable to show cash for that amount. His request for a 
2. Cal. Civ. Code § 2929 provides 
that no person whose interest is subject 
to the lien of mortgage may do any act 
which will substantially impair mort-
gagee's security. This provision re-
quires determining what impairment is 
substantial. In the case at bar, the first 
trust was $15,900; the second trust, $2,-
750. The impairment was $890. The 
impairment of security to the extent of 
30% of the debt secured is certainly 
su bstantial. 
3. Osborne, Mortgages, 318-319 
(1951). 
4. 254 Cal. App.2d 241, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
188 (1967). 
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delay to secure cash was denied. The court held this proper 
because the outside buyer might have disappeared in the 
interim, withdrawing his bid. In distinguishing dictum in a 
prior case,5 the court leaned toward an opposite result if 
the only parties bidding had been the holders of the first 
and second trust deeds. There the beneficiary of the first 
trust would have lost nothing by allowing the second bene-
ficiary a reasonable period to go to the bank to secure cash. 
In the instant case, however, the outside purchaser, who was 
willing to pay cash, might have withdrawn his bid. The court 
was willing to protect a junior lienholder only where it would 
not injure a senior lienholder. 
Concurrent Estates 
Two California cases this year demonstrate the strong and 
continuing hold of common-law doctrine and the continued 
importance of form over substance in the field of real property 
titles. 
In Burke v. Stevens6 one joint tenant conveyed her interest 
to a straw man who then reconveyed it to her. None of the 
deeds was recorded or returned to her but rather they were 
placed in her attorney's file. Despite the fact that the other 
joint tenant had no knowledge of the conveyance and no 
innocent party's rights had intervened, the court held that the 
secret conveyance was sufficient to terminate the joint tenancy. 
In another case, Clark v. Carter,7 one joint tenant had con-
veyed property from herself as joint tenant to herself as tenant 
in common and recorded the deed. The court adhered to the 
common-law rule that every conveyance requires a grantor 
and a grantee and that they must be different people. It was 
argued that since California Civil Code section 683 permits 
a transfer from an individual to that individual and another 
as joint tenants, it should also permit the severance of joint 
tenancy without the use of a straw man. The court, disagreed, 
5. Kleckner v. Bank of America, 97 7. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. 
Cal. App.2d 30, 217 P.2d 28 (1950). Rptr. 923 (1968). 
6. 264 Cal. App.2d 30, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 87 (1968). 
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however, reading California Civil Code section 1039 to pro-
hibit any transfer where only one party is involved. This is a 
strained reading of section 1039, which simply defines the 
word "transfer" as an act by which the title to property is 
conveyed from one living person to another. It can be argued 
that the conveyance from one person in a particular form to 
himself in a different form is equivalent to the transfer from 
one person to another. Furthermore, the section seems to be 
a preliminary definition to a large number of sections inter-
preting "transfer,"8 and having nothing whatsoever to do with 
the question at bar in this case. 
Some footwork was needed to sustain the logical symmetry 
of this area of law in Estate of Casella.9 Here, one of the joint 
tenants fraudulently induced his wife, the other joint tenant, 
to deed her interest to him. He then conveyed the property 
to a bona fide purchaser. The court held that the joint 
tenancy was never severed; the deed from husband to wife 
was fraudulent and therefore voidable. When the court set 
the deed aside, it declared that it was as though it had never 
existed. Faced then with the contention that the husband's 
subsequent conveyance of the entire property terminated the 
joint tenancy, the court again dodged. It held, confusingly 
enough, that the husband did not intend to sever the joint 
tenancy by making the conveyance, but rather intended to pass 
full title. Under the rule that the sale of joint tenancy prop-
erty impresses joint tenancy upon the proceeds, the court then 
held that the proceeds were subject to the usual rules of 
survivorship. 10 The analysis here is inadequate. The court 
neglected to observe that the fraudulent, voidable deed from 
wife to husband was never avoided. A bona fide purchaser 
intervened, preventing the wife from recovering her interest 
in the realty itself. It would have been better to consider 
the realty impressed with a constructive trust in joint tenancy 
because of the fraudulent procurement of the deed. When it 
8. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1040-1085. sale the joint tenancy relationship as to 
9. 256 Cal. App.2d 312, 64 Cal. the purchase money was destroyed 
Rptr. 259 (1967). would be to give Domenico a premium 
10. The court's justification for this on his fraud." 256 Cal. App.2d at 323, 
IS interesting. "To hold that by this 64 Cal. Rptr. at 266. 
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was sold, the proceeds would have been held in the same 
fashion. But to say that there was no actual severance of 
the unities here by either of the two conveyances is an un-
satisfactory fiction. 
The right to the use of property was litigated in Garibaldi 
v. Garibaldi. ll The parties held several contiguous parcels of 
timberland as tenants in common. Defendant cut timber from 
one parcel which constituted more than his share of the value 
of the timber on that property, but less than his share of the 
total value of the timber. The court held that no action 
would lie for recovery of an aliquot share of the profits be-
cause the property could be reasonably partitioned to satisfy 
the parties' interests. While this case does not purport to be an 
extension of the rule that business profits earned on the prop-
erty need not be shared with non-risk taking co-tenants/2 it 
seems contrary to several prior California cases13 which require 
the co-tenant to account for net profits from mines, oil wells, 
or lumbering. The case can, however, be reconciled on the 
theory that it was combined with an action for partition and it 
was as easy to partition, considering the ease of apportioning 
the remaining timber value of the land, as it was to apportion 
the profit and then partition the land into portions of current 
value. It is not precedent for ,denial of an accounting where 
there is no partition, or where partition is not possible in equi-
table fashion because one of the co-tenants took excessive 
profits from the land. 
Boundaries 
Where the parties are uncertain as to the boundary between 
their property, a boundary fixed by an oral agreement will 
be valid if one of the parties relies thereon to his detriment.14 
The justification for this doctrine is that the uncertainty of 
11. 264 Cal. App.2d 9, 70 Cal. Cal. 134, 27 P. 863 (1883); Payne v. 
Rptr. 92 (1968). Callahan, 37 Cal. App.2d 503, 99 P.2d 
12. Pico v. Columbet, 12 Cal. 414 1050 (1940); Hihn v. Peck, 18 Cal. 640 
(1859). (I 861). 
13. See, for example, McCord v. 14. Burby, Real Property § 124 
Oakland Quicksilver Mining Co., 64 (I 965). 
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the boundary and the acquiescence for such a period of time 
as to found reliance is tantamount to a construction of the 
deeds that will be binding on the parties. It is a way of avoid-
ing the statutory prohibition on conveyance of interests in land 
without a written document. It is also designed to secure 
repose in boundary disputes. 
In Roman v. Ries,15 defendants purchased land adjacent to 
plaintiff's predecessor without knowing the exact boundary 
line. Plaintiff's predecessor pointed out the boundary line but 
was mistaken. In reliance thereon, defendant built his 
house partly on plaintiff's predecessor's land. Plaintiff sued 
to quiet title, contending that the agreed boundary had not 
been maintained for the period of the statute of limitations. 
The court held that the defendant had relied on the agreed 
boundary to his detriment in constructing the house and 'that 
he should not be deprived of it to his injury. The court went 
on to hold that only that portion of plaintiff's land which 
had reasonable relation to the construction would be trans-
ferred as a result of the boundary agreement. Against defend-
ant's contention that the boundary agreement should either 
be approved in full or disapproved, the court held that equity 
could fashion whatever relief seemed appropriate. Here, the 
boundary agreement was upheld only because the defendant 
would have suffered damage otherwise. There was no reason 
to give him more land than would be sufficient to counteract 
that damage. The decision demonstrates that the court will 
fashion a remedy as flexible as necessary to find a solution 
without unjustly enriching the prevailing party. Presumably 
the judgment will be recorded to put future purchasers on 
notice of the odd boundary lines. 
Easements and Licenses 
In recent cases the courts have taken a liberal view of 
the purposes behind easements and have found that a change 
in use conforms to the original purpose. In Faus v. Los 
Angeles,16 the original grantors had given an easement for 
15. 259 Cal. App.2d 65, 66 Cal. 16. 67 Cal.2d 350, 62 Cal. Rptr. 193, 
Rptr. 120 (1968). 431 P.2d 849 (1967). 
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an electric railway. After discontinuance of the railway, the 
easement was used for a bus service. The court held that 
the grantor's intent was to provide public transportation across 
the land, and bus service was an adequate substitute. In 
Norris v. State of California ex reI. Department of Public 
Works,17 the court held that an easement granted for highway 
and road purposes along a lake included the construction 
of a roadside rest and scenic vista. 
The granting of an oral license followed by substantial 
reliance by the licensee was found to be an irrevocable 
license in Hammond v. Mustard. 1s Where the license is one 
of passage across property, as in this case, it is hard to see 
what useful function is served by not calling this type of 
estate an easement. The only possible objection, that an 
easement is an estate in real property requiring compliance 
with the statute of frauds, is not persuasive. If the equiva-
lent of an easement requires statute of frauds compliance, 
then this type of license should not be allowed under any 
circumstances. This seems an appropriate case for an excep-
tion to the statute of frauds, because the reliance provides 
sufficient evidence to avert fraud. 
Waste 
In Haskell v . Wood, 19 California adopted the unopened mine 
rule for allocation of rights in minerals on the land between 
the life tenant and remainderman. There is no waste where 
the parties intended to permit the life tenant or tenant for 
years to extract minerals from the property. The rule has 
grown up that where a mine or oil well is open, the parties 
intended to permit the person in possession of the land to 
continue working it in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
On the other hand, where the mine was sealed, it is presumed 
that the parties did not intend to permit the tenant to enjoy 
the minerals. While the unopened mine rule is universal,20 
17. 261 Cal. App.2d 41, 67 Cal. 19. 256 Cal. App.2d 799, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 595 (1968). Rptr. 459 (1967). 
18. 257 Cal. App.2d 384, 64 Cal. 20. 5 Powell, Real Property 640 
Rptr. 829 (1967). (1968), 5 A 1IIerican Law of Property 
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the converse (that an open mine may be completely exhausted 
by a tenant), although unchallenged, makes no sense. It is 
more reasonable, in searching for the intention of the parties, 
to assume that where a mine is open, it will be worked in 
accordance with the practice of the prior possessor of the 
land. In the absence of other evidence, there is no basis for 
assuming an intent of the parties to change the pattern of 
development to the detriment of the landlord or remainderman. 
The open mine rule arose when there was more concern 
for speedy development and less for conservation of natural 
resources. A more limited view of the tenant's right to remove 
minerals from open mines should prevail today. 
Real Property Securities 
Harvey v. Davisl involves the Real Property Securities 
Dealers' Ace and indicates that a very stringent interpretation 
will be given to it. The act was passed to eliminate certain 
abuses in the sale of real property securities which had pre-
viously been exempted from the aegis of the California Cor-
poration Commissioner. A substantial market in real prop-
erty securities had grown up with people buying without the 
benefit of accurate financial information on the properties 
involved. The provision construed in Harvey involved the 
question of whether an individual was engaged in the business 
of selling real property securities and thus obligated to reg-
ister and provide financial information, subject to damages. 
Plaintiff had advertised his property for sale in the newspaper. 
Defendant contacted plaintiff and offered to purchase it for 
$80,000 worth of approved second trust notes. When plaintiff 
accepted, defendant contacted a person who wished to sell 32 
second trust notes, of which 24 would equal $80,000 in value. 
Defendant promised the seller that he would dispose of the 
§ 20.6 (1952), Hardie v. Yuen, 258 Cal. 
App.2d 301, 65 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1968) 
is not to the contrary; it holds that a 
mineral lease given by one cotenant 
cannot be cancelled by the other. This 
does not bear on the question of dam-
ages. 
1. 69 Cal.2d 362, 71 Cal. Rptr. 129, 
444 P.2d 705 (1968). 
2. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 10237 et. 
seq. 
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rest. The court held, on the basis of the legislative history, 
that a person who sells 24 notes is engaged in the business 
of selling real property securities. An analogy was drawn 
to the definition of a real estate broker who is described as a 
person who sells three or more properties during the year.3 
Since 24 is more than three, the court held defendant to be 
in the business. The other obstacle was to find that the 
defendants were selling to the pUblic. Taking their lead from 
federal securities cases, the court held that the public need 
not include more than one person. The public is a class of 
persons unable to protect themselves due to a lack of special 
competence and knowledge in the field of real estate securities.4 
The stringency of this application is obvious. It would 
appear that a person who sells 24 notes to a single individual 
is no more in the business than a person who sells one larger 
note to that individual. Furthermore, the analogy to real 
estate brokers is somewhat inapposite. The essence of a real 
property security is that it is readily transferable. Realty, 
however, presents a more difficult subject for sale. Thus, a 
person may spend full time selling property and only accom-
plish three or four sales a year; the same is not likely to be 
true for real property securities. However, the interpretation 
of the phrase "in the business" is in accord with the purpose 
behind the statute-supplying appropriate information to un-
sophisticated investors. 
Landlord and Tenant 
Contributory Negligence of Landlord 
The court showed a disposition to require due care of the 
landlord in an unusual case this year. Travelers Indemnity 
Co. v. Titus5 was a suit by the landlord's insurer subrogated 
to his claim against the tenant for negligence in using an 
incinerator which did not conform to statutory requirements.6 
The tenant successfully defended on the ground that the land-
3. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 10131.1. 5. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. 
4. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 Rptr. 490 (1968). 
U.S. 119, 97 L.Ed.2d 1494, 73 S.Ct. 6. Pub. Res. Code § 4446. 
981 (1953). 
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lord was contributorily negligent in furnishing her with an 
incinerator that did not meet statutory standards and for fail-
ing to warn her of this deficiency. The court rejected the 
plaintiff's argument that the landlord is under no duty to 
warn tenants of obvious defects,7 taking the proper view that 
this doctrine is applicable only to cases where the tenant sues 
the landlord for damages. 
The obvious defect exception is really a defense of contrib-
utory negligence, rather than one of determining the required 
standard of care. Where both parties are negligent, neither 
can recover. It can, however, be argued that in both cases 
the question of negligence should be left to the jury to deter-
mine whether, under the circumstances, the landlord was 
negligent in failing to warn the tenant of the defect. Obvi-
ously, the more patent the defect, the less likely failure to 
warn will constitute negligence as a reasonable man might 
presume that another person would note the defect. 
Fixtures 
Larkin v. Cowed was a suit by the owner of an apartment 
building against the foreclosing beneficiary of a trust deed 
to recover the value of draperies and carpets installed in the 
apartment. The lower court found that since the parties 
had intended to incorporate these items of personal property 
into the realty, title to them passed with the realty. The court 
of appeal affirmed, contrasting Dean Vincent, Inc. v. Redisko, 
Inc.,9 which involved the installation of carpets in an apart-
ment building, with Plough v. Peterson10 in which carpets 
were installed in a private home. 
Hints in the opinion call for a rule of law that carpets 
installed in apartments are generally intended to be part of 
the property, whereas carpets installed in private homes are 
not. This would be a misinterpretation, since the intention 
7. Hanson v. Luft, 58 Cal.2d 443, 24 9. 232 Ore. 170, 373 P.2d 995 
Cal. Rptr. 681, 374 P.2d 641 (1962). (1962). 
8. 263 Cal. App.2d 27, 69 Cal. 10. 140 Cal. App.2d 595, 295 P.2d 
Rptr. 290 (1968). 549, 55 A.L.R.2d 1042 (1956). 
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of the parties is the keystone. Moreover, the fact that carpets 
and drapes are necessary in most modern apartments in order 
to rent them, and that they are installed with the purpose of 
leaving them there for their useful lives, does not distinguish 
apartment buildings from private homes. More and more 
frequently, private homes are being sold with the carpets and 
drapes intact. The prevalence of wall-to-wall carpeting and 
custom-made drapes would indicate that in most cases, regard-
less of the "rental" nature of the property, these items are 
intended to become part of the realty. The best way to view 
these three cases is to note that in each case the decision 
of the trial court was affirmed. Where the question is one 
of intent the decision of the trial court will usually be determi-
native. 
Constructive Eviction 
If hard cases and small cases both make bad law, then the 
law made by pro se cases is atrocious. A good example is 
Conterno v. Brown.l1 Defendant tenant moved out before 
the expiration of his lease and plaintiff landlord sued to re-
cover the rent due until the landlord found a replacement 
tenant. 
That which the defendant could take no longer was the 
noisy tenants who occupied the apartment just below his. 
They were three in number, a twelve year old and her 
parents, who joined in song at all hours, when not joined 
in noisy quarrels that made sleep impossible. Defendant 
complained to plaintiff, the common landlord, and he 
expostulated with the offending tenant, to no avail.12 
The lease provided that lessor would not be liable for damage 
arising from the acts or negligence of co-tenants, other occu-
pants, or owners or occupants of adjacent property. The 
court held that this clause prevented the tenant from claiming 
constructive eviction, following the opinion in Bilicke v. 
11. 263 Cal. App.2d 135, 69 Cal. 12. 263 Cal. App.2d at 136, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 393 (1968). Rptr. at 394. 
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Janss. 13 The better interpretation of that lease clause would 
have been to hold the landlord free from suits for negligence 
on the grounds of activities by others in the building. To hold 
that this clause provides against constructive eviction by the 
activities of others is to take a strong pro-landlord position. 
Although the case does not indicate it, there were provisions 
in the common lease enabling the landlord to control the 
tenants.14 If he failed to do so to the extent that one tenant 
made the property uninhabitable by another, this constitutes 
constructive eviction by the landlord. Although there are 
many statements in California authorities that a person is not 
constructively evicted by another tenant, they are all dicta.15 
The question had never been decided in this state. The 
general rule is that constructive eviction occurs when it is 
performed by someone deriving title from the landlord, includ-
ing another tenant.16 
The grand-daddy of constructive eviction cases, Dyett v. 
Pendleton,17 concerned the rental of adjoining units to persons 
who used them for immoral purposes, and illustrates that 
where the ousting activities are those of another tenant whom 
the landlord could control but does not, the acts of the tenant 
are considered the acts of the landlord. IS Thus, the exculpa-
tory clause should have no application in Conterno, since the 
tenant was claiming constructive eviction resulting from the 
landlord's activity in failing to quiet the other tenants. 
If the clause in Conterno was copied from Bilicke as the 
13. 14 Cal. App. 342, 112 P. 201 
(1910). 
14. The lease forbade loud noise or 
disturbances, piano playing after 6:00 
p.m., and singing. 
15. 30 Cal. Jur.2d 187, McDowell v. 
Hyman, 117 Cal. 67, 48 P. 984 (1897) 
(successful suit by a tenant against his 
landlord for damages for eviction), 
Sarina v. Pedrotti, 103 Cal. App. 203, 
284 P. 472 (1930) (action for damages 
against the landlord for the tenant's 
eviction by trespassers), Lost Key Mines 
v. Hamilton, 109 Cal. App.2d 569, 241 
P.2d 273 (1952) (eviction by trespassers 
not constructive eviction where landlord 
cooperated to oust trespassers). 
16. 2 Powell, Real Property § 225[3] 
(1967), 1 American Law of Prop. § 3-
.51 (1952). 
17. 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. [1826]). 
18. What makes this decision more 
surprising is that another adequate 
ground existed-a finding of no con-
structive eviction as a matter of fact, 
since the landlord evicted the noisy 
tenants, even releasing them from the 
remaining terms of their leases. 
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court suggested, the long time span of that case and its unper-
suasive opinion should have deterred the landlord from the use 
of such ambiguous terms. In addition, the lease in Conterno 
was a form imposed by the landlord and therefore subject 
to all the infirmities of contracts of adhesion. The general 
rule is to construe ambiguities in these contracts most strongly 
against the party writing them. The court took no such 
action here. 
Dependency of Lease Clauses 
In City of Stockton v. Stockton Plaza Corporation19 the 
court took another step toward establishing the mutual depend-
ency of lease clauses. The city had leased land adjacent to 
its urban renewal area to defendant, who agreed to construct 
a convention center and motel. The lease permitted lessee 
to terminate the lease after a year if he were unable to find 
financing but had no provision for termination by the lessor. 
The lessee was unable to find financing within a year and 
the lessor terminated the lease. The court held applicable a 
provision of the Civil Code which specified that a reasonable 
time is allowed for performance where no time is specified in 
the contract.20 
The court was swayed by the city's purpose in giving the 
lease-revitalizing the area and providing Stockton with an 
adequate convention center adjacent to the urban renewal 
facilities. The court assumed, but did not support, the view 
that the breach of lessee's covenant to build within a reason-
able time would permit lessor to terminate the lease. In assum-
ing that, the court implied that the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment and the covenant to build were mutually dependent. 
There is a strong argument, however, that the covenant to 
build was in fact a covenant to pay rent, which has always 
been dependent on the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 
19. 261 Cal. App.2d 639, 68 Cal. 20. Cal. Civ. Code § 1657. 
Rptr. 266 (1968). 
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Tort Liability of Property Occupiers 
In the most important decision of the year, Rowland v. 
Christian,l the supreme court restored sanity and coherence to 
the tort liability of a possessor of land. The general rule for 
tort liability holds a person responsible for injury to others 
resulting from his lack of ordinary care or skill in managing 
his property.2 Exceptions had, however, grown at common 
law differentiating the duty of care owed to trespassers, li-
censees, and invitees. These distinctions created a multitude 
of rules, definitions, and exceptions which often nonetheless 
resulted in liability.3 In Rowland, the court purported to 
extinguish those distinctions and to impose a duty to act 
reasonably regardless of the status of the injured party. 
Plaintiff was a social guest in defendant's apartment. -De-
fendant knew of a defect in one of the bathroom faucets, and 
had asked her landlord to fix it. Defendant failed to warn 
plaintiff of the defect when he used the bathroom, and the 
fixture shattered, injuring plaintiff severely. The trial court 
gave summary judgment to defendant. The supreme court 
reversed and remanded for trial on the question of defendant's 
negligence. 
In attempting to limit the scope of the case, it will be noted 
that, since Rowland involved a licensee, comments with respect 
to trespassers are dicta. Moreover, this case would fall within 
a recognized exception whereby the occupier of land is obli-
gated to warn a licensee of a concealed danger. 4 It is clear, 
however, that the court intended to clean the Augean stables 
of this area, and to re-establish the usual rules of tort law.5 
Rowland may have broad implications in other areas. If it 
1. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 
443 P.2d 561 (1968). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see Moreau, TORTS, 
in this volume. 
2. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. 
3. The means by which a harsh rule 
is avoided can be viewed acronymically 
as DEELS-Definitions, Exemptions, 
Exceptions, Limitations, and Special 
rules. 
4. "This was the contention made by 
appellants in the court of appeals and 
the supreme court. Apparently only 
one question by Justice Peters con-
cerned the eventual grounds for deci-
sion. " (Letter from Jack K. Burman, 
February 13, 1969.) 
5. For a full discussion of Rowland 
v. Christian see Moreau, TORTS, in this 
volume. 
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means that a single rule for tort liability should prevail, it may 
presage substantial changes in the rules relating to the right 
of a tenant or his guest to recover from the landlord for 
negligence in maintaining property. For example, where the 
landlord is negligent in providing safe facilities and the ten-
ant is negligent in failing to warn an injured party of defects 
in the premises, the injured party may presently recover from 
the tenant but not from the landlord.6 If the liability of 
owners and occupiers of property for their negligence is to be 
harmonized with the remainder of tort law, the landlord in 
such a case should also be liable to the injured party as a 
joint tortfeasor, particularly since the landlord has a statu-
tory duty to place and maintain residence property in livable 
condition.7 
This provision redresses the lack of equal bargaining power 
between landlord and tenant in residential leases and imposes 
responsibility for repair on the party with the longer term 
interest in the property and the one most likely to be finan-
cially able to make repairs.s Since the tenant is on the prem-
ises, the law also gives him the right to make repairs costing 
less than one month's rent and charge it against the rent.9 
If Rowland is extended to the area of tenant-landlord suits 
for injuries to the tenant, these statutory provisions will have 
some effect in arguments relating to negligence, contributory 
negligence, and assumption of risk. But the rather rigid rules 
insulating the landlord from liability will be modified, and 
more cases will be permitted to go to the jury. 
6. Hanson v. Luft, 58 Cal.2d 443, 24 
Cal. Rptr. 681, 374 P.2d 641 (1962), 
Gustin v. Williams, 255 Cal. App.2d 
Supp. 929, 62 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1967). 
This was not the case in Rowland, as 
there was no allegation the landlord's 
failure to repair constituted negligence 
on his part. 
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7. Cal. Civ. Code § 1941. 
8. There may be cases where the 
lessee of residential property has a 
longer term interest or a deeper pocket-
book than the lessor but these situations 
have not been drawn to my attention. 
9. Cal. Civ. Code § 1942. 
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